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I. Introduction 
Between August and November, 2017, the Myanmar military 
carried out a series of brutal attacks against Rohingya Muslim 
communities in Rakhine State in Myanmar.1 An international fact-
finding mission appointed by the UN Human Rights Council 
recommended that “senior generals of the Myanmar military should be 
investigated and prosecuted in an international criminal tribunal for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.”2 Myanmar’s 
military used Facebook as “a tool for ethnic cleansing.”3 “Members of 
 
* David L. Sloss is the John A. and Elizabeth H. Sutro Professor of Law at 
Santa Clara University. He has published three books and several dozen 
book chapters and law review articles. His scholarship focuses on the 
relationship between domestic law and international affairs. His most 
recent book, published by Oxford University Press, won prestigious book 
awards from the American Society of International Law and from the 
Alpha Sigma Nu Jesuit Honor Society. Sloss received his B.A. from 
Hampshire College, his M.P.P. from Harvard University and his J.D. from 
Stanford Law School.  He taught for nine years at Saint Louis University 
School of Law.  Before he was a law professor, he clerked for Judge Joseph 
T. Sneed of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and worked 
as an associate for Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati.  He also spent 
nine years in the federal government, where he worked on East-West arms 
control negotiations and nuclear proliferation issues. 
1.    Myanmar: What Sparked the Latest Violence in Rakhine?, BBC (Sept. 
19, 2017) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41082689 
[https://perma.cc/T7UH-REQC]. 
2. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (Sept. 17, 2018). 
3. Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook with Posts from Myanmar’s 
Military, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Section 230 and the Duty to Prevent Mass Atrocities 
200 
the Myanmar military were the prime operatives behind a systematic 
campaign on Facebook . . . that targeted the country’s mostly Muslim 
Rohingya minority group.”4 
In theory, Rohingya plaintiffs could bring a state tort law claim 
against Facebook alleging that Facebook was negligent (or worse) in 
permitting its social media platform to be utilized to spark mass 
violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar.5 Could Facebook be held 
liable in a civil suit in the United States for “complicity in genocide,”6 
or for “aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in or contributing to the 
commission” of a crime against humanity?7 Under current federal law, 
the answer is clearly “no.” Section 230(c)(1) of Title 47 of the U.S. 
Code states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.“8 Judicial decisions establish 
that Section 230 grants online service providers broad immunity for 
content posted by third parties.9 Thus, Section 230 provides Facebook 
a valid federal preemption defense to a state tort law claim.   
Section 230(e)(5) creates two statutory exceptions from that broad 
immunity: one for online service providers that facilitate child sex 
trafficking,10 and another for any person who “owns, manages, or 
operates an interactive computer service . . . with the intent to promote 
or facilitate the prostitution of another person.”11 Given the current 
statutory exceptions for child sex trafficking and prostitution, should 
 
genocide.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/NA47-
L62V].  
4. Id. 
5. See generally Ingrid Burrington, Could Facebook be Tried for Human-
Rights Abuses? The Legal Path is Murky, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/12/could-
facebook-be-tried-for-war-crimes/548639/ [https://perma.cc/Q9S6-Z4S3].  
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
art. 3, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) 
[hereinafter Genocide Convention].  
7. Crimes Against Humanity, Texts and Titles of the Draft Preamble, the 
Draft Articles and the Draft Annex Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on Second Reading, art. 6(2)(c), Int’l Law Comm’n. U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.935 (May 15, 2019) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Crimes 
Against Humanity].   
8. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). 
9. See Eric Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet 
Immunity 5 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper, Dec. 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3306737 
[https://perma.cc/NLC8-PXYK].  
10. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (2018); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595 (2018). 
11. 18 USC § 2421A(a) (2018). 
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there also be a statutory exception to permit civil suits against internet 
companies for complicity in genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity? One argument in favor of such an exception is that the 
United States has a clear duty under international law to prevent 
genocide.12 One could also make a persuasive argument that the United 
States has a duty under customary international law to prevent crimes 
against humanity, although that proposition is debatable.13 To be clear, 
I am not suggesting that the United States is violating its international 
legal duty to prevent mass atrocities by granting immunity to internet 
companies. However, withdrawal of that immunity for content that 
contributes to commission of mass atrocity crimes would be a helpful 
step for the United States to implement its duty to prevent genocide 
and crimes against humanity.  
Of course, any proposal to create a statutory exception to section 
230 immunity raises a set of complex questions about the proper scope 
of such an exception. This article identifies the key issues that would 
need to be resolved if Congress decided to create an exception along 
these lines. The remainder of this article consists of three parts. The 
first part explains why removal of immunity from civil liability is an 
appropriate mechanism to help prevent use of social media to incite or 
induce commission of mass atrocity crimes. The second part contends 
that the exception to section 230 immunity should apply to genocide 
and crimes against humanity, but not to terrorism or war crimes. The 
final part discusses a series of other issues that Congress would need to 
address to determine the proper scope of any such exception. 
II. Why Civil Liability?  
As a party to the Genocide Convention, the United States has an 
international legal duty “to prevent and to punish” the crime of 
genocide.14 The U.S. has implemented its duty to punish genocide by 
enacting a federal criminal statute to punish individuals who commit 
genocide.15 In some circumstances, laws that criminalize conduct help 
prevent commission of crimes by deterring people from engaging in the 
 
12. See Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. 
13. See generally U.N. Special Rapporteur, Sean D. Murphy, Fourth Report 
on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/725 ¶¶ 105–114 (18 
Feb. 2019). States were generally supportive of the provision in the Draft 
Articles that establishes a duty to prevent crimes against humanity. 
However, the United Kingdom claimed that this obligation should be 
understood as “a proposal for the progressive development of the law,” 
not a codification of customary international law. Id. ¶ 106. 
14. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. 
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2018). 
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prohibited conduct.16 As applied to Facebook and other social media 
companies, though, the criminalization of genocide has no value in 
either deterring or preventing genocide because there is no realistic 
prospect that prosecutors will apply the statute to impose criminal 
punishment on a social media company.17 Insofar as social media 
companies might be indirectly responsible for genocide, they would be 
guilty (at most) of aiding and abetting the crime.18 However, the federal 
genocide statute does not explicitly address liability for aiding and 
abetting genocide.19 Moreover, the statute requires proof of “specific 
intent,”20 and it is very unlikely that any social media company has 
acted with the specific intent to promote or facilitate the crime of 
genocide. Since prosecutors cannot apply the federal genocide statute 
to punish social media companies, the statute does not provide a 
significant incentive for companies to modify their policies to prevent 
third parties from using their platforms to incite mass atrocities. 
In contrast, an exception to section 230 that withdraws immunity 
from civil liability for internet companies that transmit genocidal 
messages could have a salutary preventative effect by providing a 
positive incentive for companies to block such messages. The mens rea 
for civil liability is typically a negligence standard, as opposed to 
specific intent. A negligence standard would incentivize companies to 
adopt reasonable measures to prevent third parties from using their 
platforms to incite or induce mass atrocities. Given the global reach of 
major social media platforms like YouTube and Facebook, the 
companies arguably have greater power to prevent mass atrocities than 
do many national governments. By creating an exception to immunity 
under section 230, the U.S. government could harness that corporate 
power to promote human rights.  
One could argue that social media companies do not need additional 
incentives to block users from posting genocidal messages because they 
have already taken steps to address the problem. For example, after 
learning about violence in Myanmar, Facebook removed accounts 
 
16. See BEN JOHNSON, DO CRIMINAL LAWS DETER CRIME? DETERRENCE 
THEORY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: A PRIMER (Minn. H. Research 
Dept. 2019).  
17. See Isabella Banks, International Criminal Liability in the Age of Social 
Media: Facebook’s Role in Myanmar, PUB. INT’L L. & POLICY GROUP 
(Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/lawyering-
justice-blog/2019/2/13/international-criminal-liability-in-the-age-of-
social-media-facebooks-role-in-myanmar [https://perma.cc/X3R6-VM2J]. 
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018) (stating that immunity is not granted 
from criminal liability).  
19. Id.  
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2018). 
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associated with the Myanmar military21 and hired Burmese language 
speakers to monitor content.22 However, the company did not take 
those actions until after users in Myanmar had already exploited the 
Facebook platform to incite genocidal violence.23 A federal statute 
exposing companies to potential civil liability would incentivize 
companies to act proactively to prevent harms before they occur, rather 
than responding after the fact to violence that has already occurred. To 
avoid liability, companies would need, among other things, to spend 
money to hire employees to monitor content in foreign languages. The 
risk of civil liability provides a financial incentive for companies to incur 
that cost to avert future adverse judgments. Without that incentive, 
companies are likely to avoid incurring such costs until after it is too 
late.  
Others may argue that the risk of civil liability would incentivize 
companies to restrict too much speech.24 This problem becomes 
especially acute if the rules identifying prohibited speech are too vague. 
I address the vagueness problem below. For now, it suffices to note that 
Congress could draft an exception to section 230 immunity for speech 
that induces mass atrocity crimes with as much specificity as the 
current statutory exceptions for content related to sex trafficking and 
prostitution.25 Thus, assuming the provision is carefully drafted, the 
potential threat to free speech would be no greater than the threat 
posed by current statutory exceptions. Moreover, without belittling the 
harms that result from sex trafficking and prostitution, most would 
agree that the harms resulting from genocide and crimes against 
humanity are far more serious. Therefore, the proposed exception from 
section 230 immunity for speech that induces mass atrocity crimes 
merits serious consideration. 
 
21. See Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Facebook Removes Accounts Associated with 
Myanmar Military, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/27/facebook-
removes-accounts-myanmar-military-un-report-genocide-rohingya 
[https://perma.cc/N32D-R6RG].  
22. See Steve Steccklow, Why Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in 
Myanmar, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-
facebook-hate/ [https://perma.cc/4YNM-YY9E].  
23. See id.  
24. See, e.g., Daphne Keller, Internet Platforms: Observations on Speech, 
Danger, and Money 2 (June 13, 2018) (Hoover Inst. Aegis Paper Series, 
No. 1807); Principles of Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GLOBAL 
NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/gni-principles/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9MJ-KEXH].  
25. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (2018). 
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III. Which Crimes? 
I contend that Congress should create an exception to Section 230 
immunity for genocide and crimes against humanity, but not for 
terrorism or war crimes. For both genocide and crimes against 
humanity: 1) there is a clear, agreed definition under international law; 
2) the agreed definitions exclude small-scale violence; and 3) there is at 
least a plausible argument that the United States has an international 
legal duty to prevent the crime. The crime of terrorism does not satisfy 
any of these criteria; war crimes satisfies only the first criterion.  
A terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand 
in March 2019 generated substantial public pressure to regulate online 
terrorist content.26 In May 2019, a group of governments and online 
service providers adopted the Christchurch Call to Action “to eliminate 
terrorist and violent extremist content online.”27 The United States 
government declined to join the call to action, citing concerns about 
“freedom of expression and freedom of the press.”28 Although the call 
to action is a non-binding instrument, the United States’ concerns are 
valid. The term “terrorist and violent extremist content” appears 
throughout the document, but that term remains undefined.29 Indeed, 
there is no single, agreed definition of “terrorism” or “terrorist content” 
in either domestic or international law.30 If Congress tried to translate 
the Christchurch Call to Action into a statutory exemption from section 
230 immunity, without a specific definition of terrorism or terrorist 
content, the statute would pose significant First Amendment problems 
because it would likely chill a good deal of legitimate speech.31 Although 
 
26. See Megan Specia, The New Zealand Shooting Victims Spanned 
Generations and Nationalities, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/world/asia/new-zealand-
shooting-victims-
names.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&r
egion=Footer [https://perma.cc/E56A-LDCC].  
27. Derek Cheng, Christchurch Call to Action: Govts, Tech Companies Agree 
to Tackle Violent Online Content on Social Media, N. Z. HERALD (May 
16, 2019), 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=122
31337 [https://perma.cc/73GD-P7NV].  
28. See THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
STATEMENT ON CHRISTCHURCH CALL FOR ACTION (May 15, 2019).  
29. Id.  
30. See generally Jacqueline S. Hodgson & Victor Tadros, The Impossibility 
of Defining Terrorism, 16 NEW CRIM L. REV. 3 (2013).  
31. See Evelyn Aswad, Why the Christchurch Call to Remove Online Terror 
Content Triggers Free Speech Concerns, JUST SECURITY (May 20, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/64189/why-the-christchurch-call-to-
remove-online-terror-content-triggers-free-speech-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/25JV-9R5G]; See also DAVID KAYNE, SPEECH POLICE: 
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government and private sector officials have a moral duty to prevent 
terrorist crimes, there is no international legal duty to prevent acts of 
terrorism.32 For these reasons, the proposed exception to section 230 
immunity should not apply to terrorist acts. 
A potential exception for war crimes presents a different problem. 
Section 2441 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides a detailed definition 
of “war crimes.”33 The federal statutory definition is broadly consistent 
with the definition of war crimes under international law.34 Therefore, 
in contrast to the rather amorphous concept of “terrorism,” the 
meaning of the term “war crimes” is widely agreed. However, in terms 
of the scale of harm, the agreed definition of war crimes applies to a 
very broad range of conduct, including non-lethal harm to a single 
individual35 (at the low end of the scale) to mass murder of hundreds 
or thousands of people (at the high end).36 Thus, some war crimes fit 
within the common-sense notion of “mass atrocities,” but others do not. 
More importantly, if Congress is going to authorize civil damages claims 
against internet companies by withdrawing immunity from civil 
liability, those claims should apply only to large-scale, widespread 
harms. There is a sound policy rationale for Section 230 immunity: 
internet companies should not be held liable for every harmful action 
that results from third party posts on their platforms. It would be 
unreasonable to expect Facebook to block every post that could 
potentially lead to a single violent act against a single victim. However, 
it is not unreasonable to expect Facebook to block posts that pose a 
significant risk of inducing mass violence against hundreds or thousands 
of victims. Therefore, a statutory exception to Section 230 immunity 
should not apply to war crimes because the term “war crimes” 
encompasses too much conduct that falls far short of mass atrocities. 
 
THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET 79–83 (Columbia 
Glob. Reports 2019) (discussing regulation of terrorist speech).  
32. See DAVID P. STEWART, TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS THE 
PERSEPCTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7–12 (Middle East Inst. 2018). 
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (c)–(d) (2018). 
34. See Rome Statute, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 8. The definition in the Rome 
Statute is somewhat broader than the federal statutory definition. 
However, any conduct that meets the definition in the U.S. Code would 
clearly constitute a war crime under international law. That point is 
relevant because an exception to section 230 immunity would potentially 
impose civil liability on U.S. companies for contributing to overseas 
conduct by individuals who are not U.S. nationals, and who are therefore 
not subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (2006).  
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(H) (defining the war crime of “sexual 
assault or abuse”). 
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)–(d).  
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Compare war crimes to genocide. As with war crimes, a federal 
statute provides a clear definition of genocide37 that closely tracks the 
internationally agreed definition.38 In contrast to war crimes, though, 
the term “genocide” applies only to mass violence. Criminal conduct 
constitutes genocide only if the perpetrators act with “intent to destroy, 
in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
group as such.”39 Genocide is often called “the crime of crimes”: it is 
the most serious crime known to international law.40 There is no such 
thing as “small-scale genocide.” Moreover, the United States has an 
international legal duty under the Genocide Convention to prevent 
genocide.41 Therefore, Congress should establish an exception to section 
230 immunity for third-party content that induces or incites genocide 
because the term “genocide” applies only to large-scale violence, it is 
well-defined under both domestic and international law, and the United 
States has an international legal duty to prevent genocide. 
Consider, next, crimes against humanity. Like both genocide and 
war crimes—but unlike terrorism—the term “crimes against humanity” 
is clearly defined under international law.42 Like genocide, and unlike 
war crimes, the term “crimes against humanity” applies only to large-
scale violence. Under international law, conduct constitutes a crime 
against humanity only if it is “committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”43 Thus, the 
rationale for creating an exception to section 230 immunity for mass 
atrocity crimes—that internet companies should be held accountable 
for content that incites or induces large-scale violence—applies equally 
to both genocide and crimes against humanity. However, crimes against 
humanity differ from genocide in one important respect: the term 
“crimes against humanity” is not defined under federal criminal 
statutes.44 Even so, the absence of a federal statutory definition should 
 
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2018). 
38. See Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.  
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2018); see also id.  
40. See William A. Schabs, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute 
Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ 1 J. OF INT. CRIM. JUST. 39, 51 (2003).  
41.  See Genocide Convention, supra note 6. 
42. See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(1); Draft Articles on Crimes 
Against Humanity, supra note 7, art. 2(1). 
43. See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(1); see also Draft Articles on 
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 7, art. 2(1).  
44. Some conduct that constitutes a crime against humanity under 
international law would be subject to criminal punishment under one or 
more federal statutes that address genocide, war crimes and other offenses. 
See David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8 NW. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 30, 33-35 (2009).  
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not prevent Congress from creating an exception to section 230 
immunity for crimes against humanity. From a First Amendment 
perspective, an exception to section 230 immunity would not be 
problematic if a clear definition of “crimes against humanity” is 
incorporated into section 230. Moreover, Congress could satisfy the 
clear definition requirement by incorporating the internationally agreed 
definition into federal law.45 
IV. A Modest Proposal 
Congress should create an exception to Section 230 immunity for 
cases where a company fails to prevent transmission of a message 
(whether by words or images) if that message: a) would be understood 
by ordinary listeners as incitement or inducement to commit genocide 
or crimes against humanity; and b) there is a significant risk that 
recipients of the message will commit such crimes. The statute should 
create a duty for companies to remove such content within 24 hours 
after it is posted. However, the statute should preserve immunity from 
civil liability for any company that makes a reasonable, good faith effort 
to comply with the content removal obligation, but is unable to do so. 
Finally, the statute should create a working group with representatives 
from government and industry to develop a set of best practices for 
implementing the duty to remove offending content. The statute should 
include a safe harbor provision for companies that comply with 
recommended best practices. The following paragraphs comment briefly 
on key elements of this proposal. 
Which companies?: To implement this proposal, Congress would 
need to consider which companies are covered. There is a compelling 
argument for exempting small companies—perhaps those with fewer 
than ten million registered users—because compliance with the 
statutory duty to block offending content would create an excessive 
burden for smaller companies. Congress might wish to limit the 
exception to companies that operate social media platforms, but that 
would require a definition of the term “social media platform,” a term 
that is notoriously difficult to define.46 On the other hand, the current 
 
45. As noted above, it is debatable whether the United States has a duty 
under customary international law to prevent crimes against humanity, 
but the weight of authority supports the claim that the United States 
does have such a duty. At a minimum, the duty to prevent crimes against 
humanity is an emerging norm of customary international law. See supra 
note 13 and accompanying text. 
46. See generally Eric Goldman, The Spectacular Failure of Employee Social 
Media Privacy Laws, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 31, 2014) 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/05/state_laws_to_p.h 
[https://perma.cc/43RB-JX7E].  
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statutory language, which refers to providers of “interactive computer 
service[s],”47 arguably sweeps too broadly. 
Understood by Ordinary Listeners: Legal tests for offensive or 
dangerous speech can be framed in terms of the intent of the speaker, 
or the likely consequences of the speech, or the actual content of the 
words or images conveyed.48 For this proposal to be effective, companies 
must be able to implement the proposal through a combination of 
automated filters and human content moderation. It is difficult for 
filters to screen content based on the intent of the speaker. It is 
somewhat easier (although not a trivial task) to screen content based 
on the actual content of the words or images. The “understood by 
ordinary listeners” test effectively directs companies to focus on the 
actual content, rather than the intent of the speaker, to determine 
which messages should be blocked. 
Incitement or inducement: The phrase “incitement or inducement” 
is similar to the classic First Amendment test from Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, which permits governments to “forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force . . . [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action.”49 Article 3(c) of the Genocide Convention prohibits 
“direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”50 Thus, an 
exception to section 230 immunity for incitement finds support in both 
international treaty law and First Amendment doctrine. However, the 
draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity would not make incitement 
a criminal offense. Instead, the draft Articles prohibit “ordering, 
soliciting, [or] inducing . . . the commission or attempted commission” 
of crimes against humanity.”51 The word “inducing” in the draft 
Articles is similar to the word “producing” in the Brandenburg test, but 
“inducing” is more precise. The statutory exception to Section 230 
immunity should cover both incitement and inducement because they 
are two different ways that people can use internet speech to spark 
mass violence. 
Significant Risk: Brandenburg exempts from First Amendment 
protection speech that is “likely to incite or produce” lawless action.52 
The question arises: how likely is “likely?” In this context—where we 
are concerned about inciting or inducing genocide or crimes against 
humanity—a “more likely than not” test is inappropriate because the 
 
47. 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
48. See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern 
First Amendment Doctrine, Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
719 (1975).  
49. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added). 
50. See Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(c). 
51. Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 7, art. 6(2)(c).   
52. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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gravity of the potential harm is so extreme. Chief Justice Vinson, 
writing for a plurality in Dennis v. United States,53 quoted Judge 
Learned Hand approvingly as follows: “In each case (courts) must ask 
whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, 
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger.”54 In situations where there is a risk that speech transmitted 
over the internet may incite or induce people to commit genocide or 
crimes against humanity, the potential harm is sufficiently grave that 
restrictions on free speech are justified even if the probability that the 
harm will ensue is well below fifty percent. The “significant risk” 
formulation is intended to convey this idea. 
Evaluating the risk that a particular message will incite or induce 
genocide or crimes against humanity necessarily depends on context. 
The U.S. Holocaust Museum’s “Early Warning Project” has developed 
a very helpful tool that ranks “all countries, in descending order, by 
estimated risk for onset of mass killing in 2018–19.”55 Assuming that 
the ranking is updated periodically, social media companies could 
incorporate that ranking into their risk assessments. For example, 
companies could reasonably conclude that a particular message in 
Swedish directed towards an audience in Sweden (ranked 156 out of 
162) poses a far less significant risk than a similar message in Arabic 
targeted towards an audience in Egypt (ranked 3 out of 162). Some 
may object that it would be unduly burdensome to require social media 
companies to perform that type of risk assessment. However, the 
proposed statute does not require perfection. Companies could avoid 
civil liability by making a reasonable, good faith effort to block 
messages that create a significant risk that recipients will commit mass 
atrocity crimes. Given the capacity of large social media companies to 
cause widespread harm by disseminating genocidal messages to millions 
of people, and given the vast resources at their disposal, it is not unduly 
burdensome to require them to make reasonable efforts. In actual civil 
litigation, factfinders could rely partly on industry experts to determine 
whether a particular company made a “reasonable, good faith effort” in 
a particular case. 
Imminence: The Brandenburg formulation permits governments to 
forbid speech only if that speech tends to incite or produce “imminent 
 
53. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
54. Id. at 510 (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2nd Cir. 
1950)). The Court’s decision in Dennis has rightfully been criticized for 
other reasons, but those criticisms do not negate the wisdom of Chief 
Judge Hand’s formulation in the majority opinion. 
55. See Ranking of All Countries: 2019-20 Risk Assessment for Mass Killing, 
EARLY WARNING PROJECT, 
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lawless action.”56 Although the imminence requirement is an important 
component of the Brandenburg test, the Supreme Court has relaxed the 
imminence requirement in two First Amendment cases where dangerous 
speech involved a potential threat of violence.57 First, in Virginia v. 
Black, the Court held that a state may prohibit “statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group 
of individuals,”58 even if such statements do not present an imminent 
threat of violence. Then, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,59 the 
Court upheld the validity of the federal statute barring material 
support to terrorism, even though the statute criminalized speech that 
did not present an imminent threat of violence. The Court’s decisions 
in Black and Humanitarian Law Project support the likely validity of 
an exception to section 230 immunity that does not include an 
imminence requirement.  
Moreover, from a policy standpoint, there are three reasons why a 
statutory exception to section 230 immunity should not include an 
imminence requirement. First, the “significant risk” element of the 
proposed statute already limits its reach. The inclusion of an imminence 
requirement in addition to the “significant risk” requirement would 
undermine the preventative goal of the statute. Second, the proposed 
exception to section 230 immunity addresses only genocide and crimes 
against humanity. As discussed previously, both crimes encompass only 
large-scale violence. In accordance with Judge Hand’s formulation, “the 
gravity of the ‘evil,’ . . . justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger.”60 Here, the scale of potential violence 
justifies a relaxation of the imminence requirement. Professor Sunstein 
has made a similar argument with respect to ISIS and terrorist violence. 
He says: “If (and only if) people are explicitly inciting violence, perhaps 
their speech doesn’t deserve protection when (and only when) it 
produces a genuine risk to public safety, whether imminent or not.”61 
Finally, section 230 addresses only civil liability, not criminal 
liability.62 In contrast, the Supreme Court developed the First 
 
56. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.  
57. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).  
58. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.  
59. Holder, 561 U.S. at 40.  
60. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212.  
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Amendment test for incitement in a series of criminal cases.63 The 
civil/criminal distinction is important for two reasons. First, the 
consequence of imposing criminal punishment on individuals (loss of 
liberty) is more severe than the consequence of imposing civil liability 
on companies (loss of money). Therefore, the government should be 
required to meet a higher burden for criminal punishment than for civil 
liability. Second, withdrawal of immunity under section 230 promotes 
a vitally important public safety function by helping to prevent mass 
violence. If the imminence requirement is not relaxed in this context, 
the statute will not be effective in promoting that public safety 
objective.  
24-Hour Removal Provision: The proposed statute would require 
internet companies to make a reasonable, good faith effort to block or 
remove offending content within 24 hours after it is posted. This 
proposal is similar to a German law, the Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz 
(“NetzDG”), which took effect in October 2017. Subject to certain 
exceptions, the NetzDG requires companies that operate internet 
platforms to remove or block “access to content that is manifestly 
unlawful within 24 hours of receiving the complaint.”64 Leading internet 
companies have already taken substantial steps to enhance their 
technical capacity to comply with such 24-hour takedown 
requirements.65 In June 2017, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and 
YouTube announced the formation of the Global Internet Forum to 
Counter Terrorism (GIFCT).66 A shared database “allows member 
companies to . . . identify and remove matching content — videos and 
images — that violate our respective policies or, in some cases, block 
 
63. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (prosecuting under 
the Espionage Act); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) 
(prosecuting under the Espionage Act); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
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Syndicalism Act); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) 
(prosecuting under the Smith Act); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969) (prosecuting under the Criminal Syndicalism Act).. 
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65. See Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube Announce Formation of 
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, MICROSOFT CORPORATE 
BLOGS (July 26, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
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66. See id.  
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terrorist content before it is even posted.”67 The existing database could 
easily be adapted to screen content that constitutes incitement or 
inducement to commit genocide or crimes against humanity. 
Of course, no screening mechanism is perfect. In March 2019, a 
gunman killed 51 people in Christchurch, New Zealand “and live 
streamed it on Facebook.”68 “It took the company roughly an hour to 
remove the video from its site. By then, the bloody footage had spread 
across social media.”69 In other words, despite Facebook’s best efforts 
to remove the video, thousands of individual social media users were 
able to disseminate the video more rapidly than the company could act 
to block transmission.70 It is questionable whether companies will ever 
be able to block completely transmission of content that goes viral on 
the internet. Therefore, the proposed statutory provision simply 
requires companies to make reasonable, good faith efforts. Application 
of the reasonableness requirement will necessarily evolve over time as 
companies improve their capacities to address this type of problem. 
Public/Private Partnership: Finally, the proposed statute would 
establish a public-private working group to develop improved technical 
solutions to the problem of screening and blocking content that 
constitutes incitement or inducement to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity. The main goal of developing improved technical 
solutions would be to enhance the ability of companies to prevent 
individuals from using the internet to incite or induce mass atrocities. 
Assuming that the working group makes significant progress over time, 
one side effect would be to ratchet up the reasonableness standard that 
companies are required to satisfy to avoid civil liability. The statute 
should include a safe harbor provision so that any company that 
complies with the “best practice” recommendations of the working 
group would be presumptively immune from civil liability. 
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